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PREFACE 
This study analyses the potential efficiency gains that can be attained by 
offering conservation contracts to farmers on the basis of competitive bidding 
compared to fixed-rate contracts. The study is original in that it contains a first 
attempt to apply auction theory to the case of agricultural conservation con-
tracts. 
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SUMMARY 
During the past decade, many European countries have implemented an 
increasing number of conservation programmes that offer farmers some incen-
tive payments for the voluntary adoption of well-defined environmentally be-
nign farming practices. Among the well-known programmes are the British 
Management Agreements, offered in designated areas of environmental sensi-
tivity; the Dutch Relatienota Programmes; the German Contractual Nature Con-
servation Schemes; the EC Low Input Agriculture Programme (1989-1992) and 
its successor programme, implemented under the umbrella of the Accompany-
ing Measures of the 1992 Common Agricultural Policy Reform. The last two 
schemes mentioned are aimed not only at environmental protection but also 
at reducing commodity surpluses. 
Most of these programmes are offered on the basis of fixed-conditions, 
fixed-rate contracts. The payment rates are normally derived from the pre-
sumed average cost of adopting the conservation technology in question. It is 
in the very nature of the problem that for some farmers, the payment rates on 
the basis of average cost exceed the amount needed to encourage participa-
t ion, while, for the others, this amount is less than the profit foregone, and 
therefore unattractive. There is evidence that those farmers who strongly rely 
on intensive and polluting technologies do not participate. On the other hand, 
farmers with an initially low level of farming intensity preferably enter into 
conservation agreements. Undoubtedly, this results in a low level of pro-
gramme cost-effectiveness in terms of environmental improvements (and sur-
plus reduction) per unit of incentive payment. 
Similar conservation programmes in the United States are offered on the 
basis of competitive bidding. Farmers who wish to participate submit bids to 
the government, stating the amount of payment for which they are will ing to 
accept the restrictions imposed by the programme. Only bids that lie below an 
unknown exclusion level, i.e. the bid cap, are accepted. 
In this report auction theory is employed to government purchases of 
environmental services (and surplus reduction) via conservation agreements. 
The aim of the report is to quantify the potential efficiency gains that can be 
achieved by offering conservation contracts to farmers on the basis of competi-
tive bidding rather than as fixed-rate agreements. After a brief theoretical 
treatment of auction markets, a model for optimal bidding decisions is devel-
oped, which captures the specific features of auction markets for conservation 
contracts. The optimal bid is the one which maximizes the expected rent of 
participation. The optimal bid of a risk-neutral decision maker is a function of 
the cost of adopting the conservation technology and the individual beliefs 
about the bid cap. A risk-averse decision maker additionally takes into account 
differences in the variability of profits between the conventional and the con-
servation technology. 
The efficiency gains of implementing a competitive bidding scheme are 
quantified by applying the bidding model to 100 model farms that differ in the 
cost of switching towards a low-input technology in the production of small 
grains. Each of these farms is characterized by a production function that gives 
the technical relationship between nitrogen inputs and the output of grain. 
The production function approach allows us to quantify for each of the model 
farms the economic effects (profit foregone), the environmental effects (nitro-
gen balance surplus) as well as the supply control effects (output reduction) of 
participation in the programme. Participation and the corresponding impacts 
on aggregate output and aggregate nitrogen emissions are simulated both for 
a competitive bidding scheme and a scheme of fixed-rate contracts. The results 
show that the implementation of a bidding scheme can yield substantial sav-
ings in government outlays per unit of emission reduction. The more asymmet-
ric the information is between farmers and the government on the costs of 
adopting the target technology and the environmental benefits associated 
with participation, the higher the benefits of implementing an auction. The 
farmers' informational advantage is normally transformed into an economic 
rent earned above the payment necessary to encourage participation. By ensur-
ing competition in the bidding process, however, farmers have to balance net 
payoffs and the acceptance probability. A higher bid increases net payoff, but 
reduces the probability of winning, and vice versa. An auction in that respect 
can be considered a mechanism that constitutes an incentive for the farmers to 
(partly) reveal their true preferences in their bids and, consequently mitigate 
the problem of information asymmetry. 
Furthermore, two issues of effective programme administration are dis-
cussed. The first one deals with strategic bidding behaviour in multiple-signup 
auctions, where farmers have proved to learn the maximum acceptable pay-
ment rates and bid almost exactly at those rates. On the basis of the bidding 
model, a strategy for the programme administrator to accommodate such stra-
tegic bidding behaviour is discussed. The second issue deals wi th the design 
and implementation of bid acceptance schemes that directly target programme 
objectives. The benefits that can be achieved by a bid ranking mechanism are 
quantified by a run of the bidding model. Finally, some conclusions are drawn 
on the usefulness of auction theory in practical auction design. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background and definition of the problem 
Theory and practice provide various ways for allocating assets or re-
sources. Those include both non-economic possibilities (e.g., lotteries) and eco-
nomic ones such as posted prices, negotiations and auctions (see Shubik (1970) 
for a more extended discussion). Posted prices are suitable to be used in cases 
where the seller knows what price to post and has the advantage of probably 
having the lowest transaction costs among the mentioned economic alternati-
ves (Rothkopf and Harstad, 1994). For many items and services, however, there 
are asymmetries of information on the market and, consequently, there is igno-
rance of what price to set. In those cases negotiations or auctions are an alter-
native and effective way of price formation, as they enable the participants to 
deal wi th uncertainty about the value of the object being sold or purchased 
(McAfee and McMillan, 1987). In fact a significant proportion of government 
purchases from the private sector is allocated on the basis of competitive bid-
ding (e.g., the building of railways or roads). An important reason for that is 
that bidding is perceived to be fair, which is politically important, making a 
transfer publicly legitimate. Moreover, by holding a public auction, the public 
authority avoids being confronted with questions about the choice of the ne-
gotiating partners or the fixed price that will arise when using one of the other 
allocating mechanisms (Rothkopf and Harstad, 1994). 
This study considers governmental purchases of environmental services 
provided by farmers through participation in conservation schemes. Following 
the arguments mentioned before, auctions would be the most preferred mech-
anism for allocating the conservation contracts for at least two reasons 1). First, 
the 'commodity' being traded, the provision of environmental services, has no 
standard value (Baneth, 1994). Second, there is a clear presence of information 
asymmetry, i.e. the farmers know better than anyone else what kind of conser-
vation actions they intend to carry out and the size of the profit foregone by 
applying the conservation contract. Auctions in that respect constitute a mech-
anism that in essence is able to have farmers reveal their true preferences. 
1) Experiences in the UK with the allocation of Management Agreements (intro-
duced as part of the 1981 Wildlife and Countryside Act (WLCA)) on the basis of 
negotiations have shown to cause efficiency problems. In the individual bar-
gaining process, farmers proved to be able to transform their information ad-
vantage about their own costs and production plans into an economic rent 
earned above the payment necessary to induce compliance (Anonymous, 1993). 
Despite this conclusion, in practice most of the conservation programmes 
are offered on the basis of fixed-condition, fixed-rate contracts. Many pro-
grammes, such as the 'EU Low Input Agriculture Programme' or the 'Market 
Relief and Cultural Landscape Conservation Programme' in Baden-Württem-
berg (Germany) aim not only at environmental protection but also at the relief 
of surplus markets. Other programmes, such as the 'Environmentally Sensitive 
Area (ESA) Scheme' in the UK and a similar scheme implemented in the Nether-
lands (in the so-called 'Relatienota' areas), only aim at the conservation of na-
ture and landscape amenities 1). Relief of surplus markets can, however, be an 
important side effect (Ministerie van Landbouw, Natuurbeheer en Visserij, 
1993; Potter, 1991). The payments offered are normally derived from the pre-
sumed average cost of adopting some well-defined environmentally benign 
farming practices, and they are equal for all farmers accepting a similar man-
agement prescription 2). It is in the very nature of the problem that for some 
farmers the payment rates exceed what is necessary to encourage participation, 
while for others it is less than the profit foregone, and therefore unattractive 
(Colman, 1989). There is evidence that particularly those farmers who strongly 
rely on intensive and potentially polluting technologies do not participate, 
while farmers with an initially low level of farming intensity preferably enter 
into conservation agreements. Undoubtedly, this results in a low level of pro-
gramme cost-effectiveness in terms of the environmental improvements (and 
surplus reduction) per unit of government outlays. 
The basic principle of 'equal payment for equal commitment' ensures the 
(politically preferred?) equal treatment of all participating farmers indeed. 
Nevertheless, it insinuates the involvement of a number of disadvantages, 
which may substantially lower the performance of conservation programmes. 
The 'U.S. Conservation Reserve Programme (CRP)' aimed at reducing soil 
erosion and commodity surpluses by idling environmentally sensitive land, and 
the 'U.S. Wetlands Conservation Reserve Programme (WRP)' are - to the best 
of our knowledge - the only conservation programmes offered on the basis of 
competitive bidding. Farmers who wish to participate, submit bids to the gov-
ernment authority in charge of the programme in which they state the amount 
of payment for which they are will ing to take the land out of production and 
establish a vegetative cover. Only bids below a previously unknown exclusion 
level, the bid cap, are accepted. The bid caps are differentiated according to 
soil productivity and the environmental sensitivity of the land, thus taking into 
1) And in some cases in the UK at keeping farmers in business in less-favoured 
areas. 
2) Payments in the ESA scheme in the UK, for instance, range from only EP 10 per 
hectare for a low level management prescription for extensive sheep and cattle 
grazing in the North Peak ESA to EP 300 per hectare for the 'tier 2' management 
prescription of the Brecklands ESA (Colman, 1991). In the Netherlands on top of 
a subdivision into management prescription, payments also differ according to 
the type of soil to which the agreement applies: clay, peat or sand. 
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account both the individual cost and the presumed environmental benefits of 
participation. 
Based on the previous analysis the definition of the problem is formu-
lated as follows: 
'What is the potential of efficiency gains that can be attained by offering 
conservation contracts to farmers on the basis of competitive bidding 
compared to fixed-rate contracts?' 
1.2 Aim of the study, methodology and outline of the report 
Both in the literature and in practice, the possible role of auctions and 
auction theory in assigning conservation contracts is rarely discussed. Therefore 
the aim of this study is to stimulate and contribute to this discussion by analys-
ing the farmer's bidding behaviour and providing an estimate of the benefits 
of auctions in assigning agricultural conservation contracts. 
The study starts off with a brief essay on what theory tells about optimal 
auction design in case of conservation contracts. In chapter 3 a model for opti-
mal bidding decisions is developed that captures the specific features of auc-
t ion markets for conservation programmes. In the next chapter the model is 
applied to 100 model farms that differ in the cost of adopting towards a low-
input technology in the production of small grains. Participation and the corre-
sponding impacts on aggregate emission and output reduction are simulated 
both for a competitive bidding scheme and an offer system of fixed-rate con-
tracts. Subsequently, chapter 5 analyses to what extent the government can 
enhance programme performance by manipulating control variables. Finally, 
the report ends with some concluding remarks. 
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2. AUCTION THEORY AND CONSERVATION 
CONTRACTING 
2.1 Four basic auction types 
What is an auction? 'An auction is a market institution with an explicit set 
of rules determining resource allocation and prices on the basis of bids from 
market participants' (McAfee and McMillan, 1987:701). Classifying auctions 
based on the rules they exert, four basic auction types can be distinguished for 
a unique item being bought or sold: English, First-price sealed bid, Second-price 
sealed bid, and Dutch, although many variations upon the basic forms are used 
(Baneth, 1994). In the English 1) auction, the price of a good to be sold, is suc-
cessively raised until only one bidder remains. The winning bidder's payoff is 
his valuation of the good minus his own (highest) bid. The English auction is 
often used for selling antiques and artwork. The Dutch or descending-bid auc-
tion is the reverse of the English auction. Now the seller announces an initial 
bid which he successively lowers until one bidder accepts the bid. The bidder's 
strategy is influenced by both his own valuation of the good and his beliefs 
about his competitors' valuations. The Dutch auction is used, for instance, for 
selling flowers in the Netherlands. In the First-price sealed bid auction, which 
is often used for government procurement contracts, each potential buyer sub-
mits one bid and the highest bidder wins. The basic difference between this 
auction type and the English auction is that in the latter each participant can 
observe his rivals' bids, and accordingly can revise his own bid. In the former 
auction type, on the other hand, each participant submits only one bid in igno-
rance of his rivals' bids. The bidder's strategy in a First-price sealed bid auction 
is guided by the same features as in the Dutch auction, while the winning bid-
der's payoff is his value minus his bid. The Second-price sealed bid auction or 
Vickrey auction, finally, exerts the same auction rules as the First-price sealed 
bid auction except that the winning bidder who offers the highest price, only 
pays the second highest bid. This auction type has been developed and intro-
duced in theory by Vickrey (1961), but is seldom used in practice. 
Which of the four auction types should be chosen in case of conservation 
contracts? 
Auction design can be considered a principal-agent problem in the sense 
that the principal aims at setting up auction rules in a way that provides the 
highest benefits to himself. In the case of conservation contracting, the govern-
ment, as purchaser of environmental services, acts as the principal and, there-
fore, organizes the auction. The government's objective is to maximize the 
environmental benefits, given some budget limitation. The farmers, as poten-
1) Also called the oral, open or ascending-bid auction. 
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tial suppliers of environmental services, react to the bidding environment set 
up by the principal. Their objective is to maximize expected net revenue or 
expected utility. This is reflected in the farmers' bids. From the government's 
point of view, the type of auction to be chosen should be one that constitutes 
an incentive for the farmers to reveal their true preferences in their bids. 
2.2 The Benchmark model and its assumptions 
Theory shows that under a set of basic assumptions each auction form 
yields on average the same revenue to the auctioneer. This is known as the 
Revenue-Equivalence Theorem (Myerson, 1981; Riley and Samuelson, 1981; 
Vickrey, 1961). The assumptions are that (McAfee and McMillan, 1987) 1): 
1. the bidders are risk-neutral; 
2. the bidders have independent private values; 
3'. there is symmetry among bidders; 
4. payment is a function of bids alone; 
5. there are zero costs to bid construction and implementation. 
This model is referred to in literature as the Benchmark model. Relaxation 
of the various assumptions violates the Revenue Equivalence Theorem and 
consequently leads to other conclusions about the optimal auction form. Most 
of the analytical literature on auctions deals with the Benchmark model or 
related issues. Milgrom (1989) states that although this makes data collection, 
model construction and solving the optimisation problem easy, it may often 
'fail to portray the auction environment accurately' (Milgrom, 1989:4). Roth-
kopf and Harstad (1994) in a more recent article underline Milgrom's argument 
by refering to the fact that most of literature analyses 'single isolated auctions' 
that sometimes lack realism, but add that 'auction models can sometimes serve 
as useful building blocks or starting points for analyses that take account of the 
effects of other transactions' (Rothkopf and Harstad, 1994:369). This study in-
tends to give in, at least partly, to both arguments in at least two ways. Al-
though the analysis starts with the Benchmark model, in the remainder of this 
section some basic assumptions will be relaxed, making the model more realis-
tic for the specific case of allocating conservation contracts wi th consequences 
for the optimal auction design. Moreover, as said in the introduction, section 
five presents some recommendations of how to effectively implement bidding 
systems, taking into account the assumptions made in the model and the auc-
tion environment in practice by using the experiences gained with the CRP in 
the U.S. 
1 ) In some game theory models of single auctions two additional assumptions are 
made (Rothkopf and Harstad, 1994): 
1. there is a single, isolated auction involving a fixed set of bidders; 
2. the rules of the auction are commonly known, firm and credible. 
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2.3 Relaxing the assumptions 
Risk neutrality 
With respect to the assumption of risk-neutral bidders, empirical analysis 
does not arrive at a unanimous judgement. Although farmers are generally 
assumed to be risk-averse, studies assessing farmers' conservation attitudes 
produce ambiguous results. Lynne, Shonkwiler, and Rola (1988), for instance, 
show that there is some degree of risk aversion involved in the conservation 
attitude and, consequently, conservation effort by farmers, mainly related to 
the income effect. Work of Gasson and Potter (1988) and Fraser (1991), on the 
other hand, concludes that risk aversion with respect to conservation is a phe-
nomenon that is only marginally present among the farmers. Baneth (1994) 
somewhat relaxes the results from the last two studies by saying that they have 
been carried out at a time of relative agricultural price stability, which may 
induce that farmers' risk aversion was probably underestimated. This argu-
ment, however, does not explain the difference in outcome with the study of 
Lynne, Shonkwiler and Rola, which was carried out in the same period. 
Assuming risk aversion has implications for the auction form to choose. 
The theoretical literature shows that with risk-averse bidders, the first-price 
sealed bid auction produces larger expected revenues to the auctioneer than 
the English or second-price sealed bid auction (Riley and Samuelson, 1981). In 
case of conservation programmes risk aversion translates to a higher level of 
programme performance in terms of the ratio between environmental im-
provements and the cost to the government. The reason behind this expec-
tancy is that the conservation premium as a non-stochastic income component 
will decrease the farmers' income uncertainty, which will induce them to mar-
ginally lower their bids (as compared to the risk-neutral bidder) in order to 
increase the probability of acceptance. Although a first-price sealed bid auction 
is the best auction form to be chosen, it is not the optimal auction design as it 
fails to fully exploit the bidders' risk aversion. A solution to this problem could 
be to impose additional risk on the bidder either by penalizing undesired and 
subsidizing desired bidding behaviour 1) or by concealing the number of com-
peting bidders 2). 
Independent private values 
The second assumption of independent private values is one of two ex-
tremes. The 'independent private values model' assumes that each bidder 
knows precisely how highly he or she values the item or, in case of bidding for 
1) Matthews (1983) for instance proposed a bidding fee that, in a conservation 
programme, is an increasing function of the bid. 
2) See footnote nr. 5, which shows that it is a standard assumption in the 
Benchmark model that each bidder knows the exact number of bidders he is 
competing with. 
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conservation contracts, how high the production costs or profits foregone are. 
Moreover, the individual bidder does not know the valuation of the item by 
the competing bidders but perceives those valuations as being drawn from 
some probability function. Learning about the competitors' valuations will not 
cause the bidder to change the own valuation, although he might, for strategic 
reasons, change the bid. This model applies for instance to an auction for an 
antique with no resale, but also for government-contract bidding (McAfee and 
McMillan, 1987). The other extreme is the 'common values model' in which the 
item being auctioned has an objective true value. The bidders' perceptions of 
this value are independent draws from a probability distribution that is known 
to all participants in the auction. An example of the common value model is an 
auction for antique with resale in which the buyers will make a guess about the 
value of the antique on the resale market. Many items auctioned in practice, 
however, contain features of both extremes. For instance, the purchasers of 
antique for resale may have different resale possibilities so that the ultimate 
real value of the item depends on the buyer who wins. In such a case bidders' 
valuations are correlated or affiliated. Milgrom and Weber (1982) have devel-
oped a more general auction model that allows valuations be to correlated and 
that contains both the independent private values model and the common 
values model as extreme cases. Bearing this in mind, it is reasonable to main-
tain the independent private values assumption for conservation contract auc-
tions. Each farmer is assumed to know his own production costs in terms of 
profit foregone when participating in the conservation programme that, be-
sides some other factors, determines his bid. This information can be consid-
ered independent private information. Experiences with the U.S. CRP pro-
gramme have learned that a common value element can arise when the conser-
vation contracts are not sold in one auction but in different sequential auctions 
(Reichelderfer and Boggess, 1988). Farmers then can analyse the results of the 
preceding rounds and can update (often increase) their bids. 
Symmetry among bidders 
The requirement of symmetry among bidders means that all bidders draw 
their valuations from the same distribution function. For conservation pro-
grammes this should, however, not necessarily be the case. Farmers on differ-
ent locations may have a different quality of land, resulting in different 
achievements of environmental quality. For the conservation programme this 
may imply that although bids may be equal in monetary terms, the resulting 
provision of environmental services may differ. This case is known as an asym-
metric bidding situation, as different farmers draw their valuations from differ-
ent probability functions. Theory tells that in the case of asymmetric bidders, 
the optimal auction system for the government agency generally is the one in 
which the item being purchased is assigned to the lowest bidder (Myerson, 
1981). In case of conservation contracts, however, such an optimal auction de-
sign is discriminatory in the sense that it favours the lower bidders with possibly 
a low ratio of environmental output per monetary unit of bid against higher 
bidders with a higher ratio. Besides possible political objections such a system 
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therefore has the practical objection of not achieving the targets of the pro-
gramme. Practical solutions to this problem are discrimination of bids (Anony-
mous, 1993), the establishment of eligibility criteria with respect to which farm-
ers are actually allowed to participate 1) (Reichelderfer and Boggess, 1988) or 
the distinction, a priori, of homogeneous classes of bidders based on natural 
circumstances (Baneth, 1994; Latacz-Lohmann, 1993). 
Payment is only a function of bids 
The Benchmark model further assumes that payments can only be a func-
t ion of bids. Sometimes, however, it is in the seller's or buyer's interest to make 
payments conditional on some additional information about the winners' valu-
ation of the item. McAfee and McMillan (1987) exemplify this wi th an auction 
of oil rights to government-owned land. After the assignment of the rights the 
government can observe the actual amount of oil extracted, which provides her 
wi th additional information about the winning bidder's true value of the oil 
right. The payment by the winning bidder may now equal his or her bid plus 
a royalty payment based on the amount of oil extracted, although also other 
bidding mechanisms are possible. A similar system may be applied in case of 
conservation contracts by linking the payment level to the monitoring. The 
winning bidders receive part of their bid when the contracts are assigned and 
the remainder depending on the achieved results at the end of the contract 
period. 
Zero costs to bid construction and implementation 
The final assumption deals with the costs involved in bid construction and 
implementation. Although in the Benchmark model they are assumed to be 
zero, the costs associated with bid construction and submission may not be 
negligible in the bidding process. In case of conservation contracting, for in-
stance, farmers have to acquire information about the expected profits fore-
gone under the conservation scheme. The costs involved in bid preparation can 
be considered sunk costs once the bid has been submitted (Rothkopf and 
Harstad, 1994). Moreover, those costs imply a loss to the farmer if the bid is 
rejected and a reduction in the accruing economic rent if the bid is accepted 
(Anonymous, 1993). Bid preparation costs being too high will therefore dimin-
ish the number of bidders and probably violate the efficiency potential of the 
auction. To counteract this potential problem when assigning conservation 
contracts it is important that the auctioned contracts are simple and under-
standable to the farmers. Moreover, it is generally in the purchasing govern-
ment agency's interest to provide as much information as possible about the 
contracts auctioned. 
1) A solution used in the CRP. 
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2.4 Reserve prices and multiple similar contracts 
Finally two more issues will be discussed: the use of reserve prices and 
variation in purchasing constraints. With respect to the former the question can 
be raised whether the government agency should impose a reserve price or in 
case of conservation contracts set a bid cap above which no bids are accepted. 
Theory says it should as it provides farmers with an incentive to reveal their 
bids honestly that will consequently lower the expected costs for the purchas-
ing government agency. Therefore, although the Revenue Equivalence stated 
that under the Benchmark model all auction forms yield on average the same 
revenue to the government agency, theory adds that any of these auction 
forms only is the optimal auction mechanism if it is supplemented by an opti-
mally set reserve price (Myerson, 1981; Riley and Samuelson, 1981) 1). A reserve 
price, however, only proves to be effective when bidding competition is weak 
(McMillan, 1994), which may be the case when the number of bidders is small 
or when there is collusion among bidders. 
The last issue deals with the number of conservation contracts purchased 
by the government agency. The theory described until now applies to a unique 
item being auctioned. A conservation programme, however, generally offers 
multiple similar contracts. To what extent does this change the conclusions 
drawn until now? For multiple similar contracts either a discriminatory first-
price sealed bid or a uniform-price auction can be used. In the first case, the n 
lowest bidders are rewarded, receiving the payment stated in their bids. In the 
uniform-price auction the n successful bidders receive a payment at the amount 
of the lowest unsuccessful bid. The uniform-price auction consequently, corre-
sponds to the second-price sealed bid auction in the single unit case, and in 
determining the optimal auction form, the conclusions set out for a single-item 
auction, also apply for the multiple-unit auction considered here (McAfee and 
McMilllan, 1987). 
In case of multiple contracts with no budget constraint, optimal auction 
design additionally requires the use of a reserve price in order to increase bid-
ding competition. 
1) In auction theory one generally assumes that bids are a function of bidders' 
valuation of the item being sold or purchased. The optimal reserve price as set 
by the auctioneer in all of the auction forms under the Benchmark model now 
equals the valuation as held by bidders that earns a payment equal to the 
auctioneer's valuation of the item. 
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3. A MODEL OF PARTICIPATION AND OPTIMAL 
BIDDING BEHAVIOUR 
3.1 The general bidding model 
A necessary condition for farmers to participate in a conservation scheme 
is that the expected utility of income in case of participation is at least equal 
to or higher than in case of non-participation. Let us assume that the farmers 
eligible for the programme have private information about the profits of farm-
ing, both under the conventional and the conservation technology, denoted 
by n o and n „ respectively 1). Under a fixed-rate offer system with the fixed rate 
denoted by p , farmers will participate if: 
UflVpyufllo^O (1) 
where U() is a monotonically increasing, twice differentiable von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function. L/fllJ will in the following be called the reserva-
t ion utility. Whereas with a fixed-rate payment farmers only need to decide 
whether or not to participate, under a bidding system also the amount of the 
bid is at the farmers' discretion. 
Before proceeding with the farmer's decision rule in a bidding environ-
ment, let us first assume that the governmental authority that administers the 
conservation programme announces to set a reserve price or bid cap ß. All indi-
vidual bids below ß will be accepted, while bids above the bid cap are rejected. 
The farmer will now tender a bid b if his expected utility in the case of partici-
pation exceeds his reservation utility: 
ü(nrfa)P(bsß).u(n0)(i-P(bsß))>ü(n0) (2) 
where P stands for probability. The bidders neither know the bid cap, nor the 
other bidders' switch-over costs and bid prices. It is then plausible to assume 
that each bidder forms individual expectations about ß. These expectations can 
be characterized by its density function f(b) and distribution function F(b). The 
probability that a bid will be accepted, can then be written as: 
Ffesß)- (Hb)db^-ftb)
 (3) 
J b 
1) We shall use the expressions profit foregone, switch-over costs, costs of 
participation, and profit differential as synonyms to verbalize the expression (II0 
- n,). 
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where ß denotes the upper limit of the bidder's expectations about the bid 
cap, i.e. the maximum expected bid cap. Substituting (3) into (2) yields: 
ü(nrö)(i-fl[ö)).un0)fl(ö)>u(n0) (4) 
A common characteristic of all bidding situations is the balance between net 
payoffs and the acceptance probability. A higher bid increases the net payoff, 
but reduces the probability of winning, and vice versa. The farmer therefore 
faces the problem of determining the optimal bid, which is the one that maxi-
mizes the expected utility (on the left of the relation sign) over and above the 
reservation utility (on the right of the relation sign). In the following two sec-
tions the optimal-bid formulas will be derived for both risk-neutral and risk-
averse bidders, as risk attitude studies about farmers' conservation behaviour 
do not provide unambiguous arguments for a well-founded choice (see previ-
ous chapter). 
For ease of analysis, both Benchmark assumptions that there are no costs 
in bid preparation and implementation and that payment is only a function of 
the bid, are maintained 1). 
3.2 The risk-neutral decision maker 
For a risk-neutral decision maker, who simply maximizes expected profits, 
expression (4) can be rewritten as: 
(nrb-iy-d-rW)>o (5) 
which denotes the expected income gain through participation in the conserva-
tion scheme. The optimal bid of a risk-neutral decision maker, b'm, that maxi-
mizes the expected net payoffs, can now be derived by maximizing (5) through 
the choice of b. This yields: 
bm - n0-n,.±jjj& (6) 
1) The former assumption is, however, not as unrealistic as it seems. From ex-
pression (4) it is clear that each farmer has to acquire information about the ex-
pected profit foregone under the conservation scheme. The same costs are, 
however, reasonably borne by farmers who have to decide whether or not to 
join a fixed-rate conservation scheme. Bearing the aim of this article in mind, 
negligence of bid preparation costs will not necessarily violate the results of the 
analysis. 
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In order to be able to calculate a number for b'rn, assumptions must be 
made about the type of distribution considered. For reasons of simplicity, it is 
assumed that the bidders' expectations about the bid cap are uniformly distrib-
uted in the range [ß,ß] .where ß and ß represent the minimum and maxi-
mum expected bid cap, respectively. Although assuming a triangle distribution 
would be more realistic, this would increase the mathematical burden unrea-
sonably. The density and distribution functions of a rectangular distribution are 
given as follows (adapted from Law and Kelton, 1991): 
m-
w--
0 
1 
p-ß 
0 
0 
M 
ßß 
1 
if £xß 
if ßsösß 
if te>ß 
if tx$ 
if ßsösß 
if teß 
(7a) 
(7b) 
In analyzing optimal bidding behaviour, it is important to note that it 
does not make economic sense to submit a bid lower than the minimum ex-
pected bid cap ß . Furthermore, a bid will be submitted only if the (optimal) 
bid price at least covers the cost of adopting the target technology. Taking 
these arguments into account and substituting (7) into (6), the optimal-bid 
formula of a risk-neutral decision maker can then be written as 
• maxi " _ ,ß s.t. b;n>n0-n, (8) 
Two things are important to note from expression (8): 
1. the optimal bidding strategy of a risk-neutral decision maker is a linearly 
increasing function of the bidder's switch-over cost and the maximum 
expected bid cap. The optimal bid is simply half of the profit foregone 
plus half of the maximum expected bid cap; 
2. a positive bid of 1/z ß (or at least ß ) will be submitted by farmers for 
whom the adoption of the target technology does not involve any cost. 
Therefore, a free-rider problem, encountered under the fixed-rate con-
tract scheme, is expected to exist also under a competitive bidding 
scheme. 
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3.3 The risk-averse decision maker 
For a risk-averse decision maker it is important that the conservation pay-
ment is a non-stochastic income component. Moreover, in his decision whether 
or not to participate in the programme he will also take account of possible 
changes in the variation of his income from market production when adopting 
the conservation technology. Those aspects affect the risk-averse farmer's util-
ity as introduced in equation (2). Since utility as such is, however, not tangible, 
it is replaced in the following mathematical exposition by the certainty equiva-
lent (CE): 
CErC\F{b)hCE0F{b)>CE0 (9) 
Since the certainty equivalent is defined as the difference between expected 
income and a risk premium (RP), (9) can be rewritten as: 
(nrb-RP,(W)-(i-rW)*(no-«y-W>no-«Po do) 
where the risk premium RP() is a function of the expected value ([R,+b] and I l 0 
for RP1 and RP0, respectively), and the standard deviation (a) of income (see 
appendix 1 for an elaboration of the formulas). After rearranging terms: 
Wrb-RP,(b)) avray] (i Kb))>o d D 
This expression denotes, analogous to (5), the expected gain in certainty 
equivalent through participation in the conservation scheme. Maximizing (11) 
wi th respect to o yields the optimal-bid formula of the risk-averse decision 
maker. Again, take into account that no bids will be submitted below the mini-
mum expected bid cap. Moreover, the optimal bid will be submitted only if it 
ensures a gain in certainty equivalent. Then, 
ù„=max rio-n, (RP0RP,(b)) * (1 Wi'tf>)) ^fr- -ß 
factor<1 
s.t GE,tfg > CEQ 
premium (12) 
From (12) is clear that the optimal bid comprises the profit foregone mi-
nus the difference in risk premiums plus a premium multiplied by a factor less 
than one. The greater the risk aversion, the smaller the factor and, thus, the 
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lower the optimal bid price. The analogy to the bidding strategy of risk-neutral 
bidders is clear by setting RP0 and RP, equal to zero. Then expression (12) is 
reduced to the optimal-bid formula of risk-neutral decision makers as given in 
(6) and (8). From (8) and (12) it is expected, as indicated in chapter 2, that risk-
averse farmers will normally tender lower bids than risk-neutral farmers, unless 
the variability of profits under the conservation technology (affecting RP,) is 
significantly higher than under the conservation technology. This may, for ex-
ample, be the case when the conservation scheme requires farmers to refrain 
from applying pesticides. 
In order to calculate a number for b"ra, assumptions on the type of distri-
bution and the type of utility function must be made. The latter is needed to 
calculate the risk premiums. In the interest of clarity, the mathematical treat-
ment of this matter has been deferred to the appendix. There the optimal bid-
ding strategy for risk-averse decision makers is derived under the assumption 
of uniformly distributed expectations about the bid cap and a utility function 
of the type U(Y) = InY. 
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4. MODEL APPLICATION TO A HYPOTHETICAL 
EXTENSIFICATION PROGRAMME 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the bidding model developed in the previous chapter, is 
applied to a hypothetical extensification programme characterized by only one 
restriction: a maximum input of 80 kg of nitrogen per hectare. The programme 
is aimed at the reduction of both nitrogen emissions and the production of 
surplus commodities. It is offered to 100 model farms of each 100 ha that differ 
in the cost of adopting the low-nitrogen technology in the production of small 
grains 1). Each of the farms is characterized by a production function that de-
scribes the technical relationship between nitrogen input and the output of 
grain. The production function approach allows us to quantify for each of the 
model farms the economic implications (profits foregone), the environmental 
effects (nitrogen emission reduction) as well as the supply control effects (out-
put reduction) of participation in the programme. Programme performance is 
simulated for different variants of an auction system and the results are com-
pared to the outcomes that would be achieved under an offer system of fixed-
rate contracts. 
4.2 The farm-level model 
For each of the model farms a production function of the type 
y(n) - a+bn+cri is assumed, where y and n denote yields of grain per hectare 
and nitrogen application per hectare, respectively; and a, b, and c are the coef-
ficients of the production function. The farms differ in soil quality and other 
natural and climatic factors. These factors are reflected in different values of 
the technological parameters a, b, and c, thus, resulting in different levels of 
nitrogen use and different yields. Those parameters have been chosen in ap-
proximation to empirically estimated production function coefficients, like 
those given in Schindler (1990) and Claupein (1994). Assuming a product price 
of p and a nitrogen per-unit price of r, for each of the model farms the optimal 
nitrogen intensity, n', the corresponding yield, y(n"), and profit, U(n") = Yl0 is 
1) Each farm is assumed to grow only small grains. 
23 
calculated, where p ro f i t is def ined as revenues minus the cost o f n i t rogen fe r t i l -
izat ion (py(n')-r n). 1) 
Individual n i t rogen balances (NB), ind icat ing the env i ronmenta l impacts 
o f t h e agr icu l tura l p roduc t ion process, are subsequent ly calculated as d i f fe r -
ence be tween the opt imal n i t rogen input , n, and the n i t rogen expor t w i t h the 
cor respond ing crop yields: NB = n- yy(n'), whe re y denotes t h e a m o u n t o f 
n i t r ogen extracted per un i t o f crop y ie ld. 
Table 4:1 Characteristics of selected model farms under conventional and low-nitrogen tech-
nology 
Characteristics 
Production a 
Function b 
Coefficients c 
Conventional technology: 
n' (kg/hectare) a) 
y(n') (mt/hectare) 
I l0=n(n") (ECU/ha) 
NB(n') (kg/heetare) b) 
Target technology: 
n s 80 (kg/hectare) 
y(n) (mt/hectare) 
n ,=n(h) (ECU/ha) 
NB(n) (kg/hectare) b) 
Differences: 
Yield (mt/ha) 
Nitrogen bal. (kg/ha) c) 
Profit (ECU/ha) 
Model farm number 
1 
24.9 
0.249 
-0.00141 
75 
3.57 
327 
10.5 
75 
3.57 
327 
10.5 
0 
0 
0 
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32.4 
0.332 
-0.0013 
113 
4.34 
489 
17.0 
80 
5.07 
475 
-11.2 
-0.27 
-17.0 
-14 
50 
38.3 
0.393 
-0.0012 
150 
7.07 
647 
22.4 
80 
6.26 
590 
-31.9 
-0.79 
22.4 
-57 
75 
42.4 
0.427 
-0.0011 
182 
8.48 
775 
28.9 
80 
6.97 
665 
-45.5 
-1.47 
-28.9 
-110 
100 
44.6 
0.436 
-0.001 
207 
9.38 
855 
38.3 
80 
7.33 
701 
-51.9 
-2.05 
-38.3 
-154 
a) At p = ECU 100 per mt grain and r = ECU 0.4 per kg nitrogen; b) At y = 18 kg nitrogen per 
metric ton (mt) yield (Source: Hydro Agri Dülmen, 1993); c) Only reductions of nitrogen emis-
sions are considered environmental improvements. If under the low-input technology the nitro-
gen balance is negative, only the initial nitrogen balance surplus over and above zero, not the 
entire difference between NB(n".) and (negative) NB(h), is taken into account. 
1) This is a simplifying assumption. In fact, it would be more realistic to take into 
account interdependences between variable inputs in the sense that a reduction 
in nitrogen intensity is likely to induce a decrease in the use of complementary 
inputs like insecticides, fungicides or growth regulators, and an increase in the 
use of substitutive inputs like green or animal manure. Assumptions about the 
size of these changes would, however, be completely arbitrary. 
24 
The economic, environmental, and supply control effects of switching 
towards the low-nitrogen technology are now simulated by entering the target 
nitrogen intensity, n, into the production function model. Assuming realistic 
prices of nitrogen and grain and a plausible extraction factory, the results both 
for the conventional and the low-input technology are illustrated in table 4.1 
for a few model farms. 
The higher the initial (optimal) nitrogen intensity has been, the larger the 
profit foregone. This implies that participation in the conservation scheme is 
offered at increasing marginal cost. A graphical depiction of the marginal cost 
curve (the switch-over cost curve) is given in the upper charts of figure 4.1 and 
4.2. Note that participation does not involve any cost if the target technology 
is already in place (like in the case of model farm # 1). It is clear that in those 
cases there is also no marginal contribution to the achievement of the pro-
gramme goals. 
4.3 Assumptions and scenarios 
The production function model is linked up with the bidding model 
through the profit differential. Recall from expressions (6), (8), and (12) that 
although the profit foregone is one of the major determinants of the optimal 
bid, the optimal-bid formulas can only be applied when assumptions are made 
on the farmer's expectations about the bid cap. The bidders' expectations are 
assumed to be uniformly distributed in a range of plus/minus 40% of the pre-
sumed average profit foregone of all eligible farmers with positive switch-over 
costs 1). In the calculations made, the average cost is ECU 67 per hectare. Con-
sequently, the range of expectations is bordered by ß = ECU 40.2 and ß = ECU 
93.8 per hectare. Moreover, it is assumed that each bidder faces the same den-
sity and distribution function, implying that all bidders have the same ex-
pectations about the bid cap. This corresponds to applying the assumption of 
symmetry among bidders. 
Quantification of the risk-averse farmers' optimal bids (according to ex-
pression (12)) additionally requires assumptions on the variability of profits, 
both under the conventional and the low-nitrogen technology, in order to 
calculate the risk premiums. It is assumed that the variation coefficient of prof-
its (excluding conservation incentive payments) is 0.25 for either technology 2). 
The aforementioned assumptions are reflected in the optimal bids. Pro-
gramme performance, however, depends not only on the farmers' bids but also 
on various issues related to auction design and the rules exerted, such as eligi-
bility criteria, bid selection rules, and the use of bid pools. As theory is ambigu-
1) We shall vary this assumption in chapter 5. 
2) The variation coefficient is defined as the ratio of the standard deviation to the 
mean. Recall this paper considers a nitrogen de-intensification programme 
without any restrictions on other factor inputs. Therefore, it is assumed that 
profit variability does not change. If also the use of pesticides were restricted, 
participation would likely increase profit variability. 
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ous about optimal auction design programme performance is simulated for 
different variants or scenarios. 
It is important to note that for all variants it is assumed that farmers are 
required to enroll their acreage into the programme on an all-or-nothing basis, 
i.e. the number of hectares is not a decision variable. Although some nature 
conservation programmes (e.g., in the Netherlands) allow farmers to choose 
which tracts of their farms to put under conservation contract, extensif ication 
programmes such as the EC Low Input Agriculture Programme require farmers 
to de-intensify their entire farm. 
The different variants chosen are: 
1. Flat-rate offer system (reference): 
a flat, pre-announced payment, p , is offered to all farmers who agree to 
implement the target technology on their farms. The payment rate is 
fixed by the government at the presumed average profit foregone of all 
eligible farmers with positive switch-over costs. All farmers who sign up 
for the programme will be accepted. Most of the conservation pro-
grammes in European countries are based on this type of payment 
scheme. From the point of view of the producers, participation is worth-
while if H r p> I I 0 for risk-neutral decision makers, and 
if Urp RPffl>U0 RP0 or, equivalently, CE, > CE0, for risk-averse farmers. 
This payment scheme will serve as reference against which the fol lowing 
schemes will be compared. 
2. Simple auction system (uniform bid cap): 
according to the theory in chapter 2 the optimal auction for multiple 
contracts under budget limitation in a risk-averse environment is a dis-
criminatory first-price sealed bid auction. Farmers submit sealed bids, 
prompting the amount of payment needed for participation. The govern-
ment announces that a uniform bid cap will be set after the closing date 
for bid submission. In order to guide the farmers in preparing their bids, 
the government notifies them that the (ex-ante) bid cap is oriented at the 
presumed average profit foregone, and that only bids below this level 
will be accepted. Although the bid cap has no function as an exclusion 
mechanism as such, its announcement is psychologically important to 
provide farmers with the incentive to bid honestly. 
Because theory is less clear about the optimal auction design in case of 
unlimited budget, within this variant two scenarios are considered: 
2a. No budget limitation: 
in contrast to the announcement, all bids are accepted, which corre-
sponds to variant 1 where all farmers who sign up for the pro-
gramme are accepted. The difference between this variant and vari-
ant 1 is that in the latter farmers are paid a pre-announced and 
equal payment, while in the former farmers receive their bids sub-
mitted; 
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2b. Budget limitation: 
the budget is restricted to the amount of variant 1 (reference). The 
government accepts bids, starting with the lowest bid, until the bud-
get is exhausted. Therewith, the ex-post bid cap is set as a residual 
at the level of the highest successful bid. 
Although the previous two variants do not expressly take account of 
asymmetry among bidders, in chapter two it was argued that its negligence can 
result in both political and practical objections because of diminishing pro-
gramme performance. In the following two variants the asymmetry issue is 
analysed by distinguishing homogeneous classes of bidders based on natural 
circumstances. It is assumed that the government has information on switch-
over costs sufficient to cluster all eligible farmers into three pools (ƒ) of equal 
size: farms with low, average, and high profits foregone. Again it is assumed 
that the bidders' expectations about the maximum acceptable bid level are 
uniformly distributed in the range of minus 40 to plus 40% of the presumed 
average switch-over cost of the pool and that all farmers within one pool face 
the same density and distribution function. By doing this, we relax the symme-
try assumption of the Benchmark model only between the pools, but stick to 
it within the pools. The different variants chosen are: 
3. Offer system with differentiated payment rates: 
a pool-specific, pre-announced payment, p. ,j= 1, 2, 3, is offered to farm-
ers who agree to sign a conservation contract. Similar to variant 1, the 
payment rate for group j is fixed by the government at the presumed 
average profit foregone of all g roup; farmers with positive switch-over 
costs. All farmers who sign up for the programme will be accepted. 
4. Bid pool auction system (differentiated bid caps): 
similar to variant 2, farmers tender sealed bids to the government. Each 
bid received is assigned to a bid pool. Like in variant 3, there are three 
pools of different switch-over cost. The government announces that pool-
specific bid caps will be set after the closing date for bid submission. Every 
farmer knows to which bidding pool his farm is assigned. Again, two sub-
scenarios are considered: 
4a. No budget limitation: 
in contrast to the announcement, all bids are accepted. 
4b. Budget limitation: 
the budget is restricted to the amount of variant 1 (reference). The 
government accepts, for each bid pool, bids, starting with the lowest 
one, within the available budget. This again implies that the ex-post 
bid cap is only a residual. 
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4.4 Results 
Figure 4.1 confronts the optimal bids under the simple auction scheme 
against a flat-rate payment fixed at the average of the switch-over cost as esti-
mated by the government. In figure 4.2 the same is depicted for an offer sys-
tem with differentiated payment rates and the corresponding bid pool auction 
scheme. Optimal bids and payment rates must be seen in relation to the switch-
over cost curve that is also depicted in figure 4.1 and 4.2. The quantitative re-
sults of the model calculations are listed in table 4.2 for risk-neutral decision 
makers and in table 4.3 for risk-averse decision makers, respectively. The col-
umns indicate the various payment schemes and the rows indicate the variables 
that measure the programme performance in relation to the flat-rate offer 
system which is set to 100. 
Implementation of the bidding schemes increases programme perfor-
mance significantly. A major reason for this is that replacing an offer system by 
an auction scheme reduces the windfalls (vertical distance between payments 
and costs in figure 4.1 and 4.2) accruing to farmers who enroll land with lower-
than-average switch-over cost, while, at the same time, some producers wi th 
higher-than-average cost are encouraged to participate. Under all auction 
scheme variants the relative increase in absolute goal achievement (amounts 
of emission and output reduction: the shaded areas in figure 4.1 and 4.2 and 
rows B and C in table 4.2 and 4.3) and in switch-over cost lies above the relative 
increase in the number of participants. Since, at the same time, farmers 
enrolling low-cost land tender bids lower than the amount they would receive 
under a flat-rate offer system, the level of programme cost-effectiveness, mea-
sured as absolute goal achievement per unit of programme outlays (rows G and 
H), rises significantly. Replacing the flat-rate scheme (1) by a simple bidding 
system (2b) yields an additional 14% of emission reduction and an additional 
25 to 26% of commodity surplus reduction with the same amount of govern-
ment outlays. Moreover, net income transfers reduce by about 16%. The pro-
gramme cost-effectiveness improves by 16 and 27-28% for the emission- and 
output reduction, respectively. 
The advantages of switching to a simple auction scheme are even larger 
if the government budget is unlimited (variant 2a). Compared to the offer sys-
tem, programme cost-effectiveness with respect to output reduction increases 
by 47%, while net income transfers reduce by 29 (risk neutrality) and 32% (risk 
aversion), respectively. 
The largest improvements in programme performance can, however, be 
achieved by differentiating payment rates and bid caps according to the pre-
sumed regional or farm type specific switch-over cost (variants 3, 4a, 4b). The 
largest absolute goal achievement is accomplished by a bid pool auction 
scheme without budget constraints (variant 4a). Although, for instance, in the 
risk-neutral case the number of participating farmers increases by only 59%, 
total emission and output reduction increases by 131 and 307% respectively, 
with a budget increase of 98%. The benefits of differentiating bid caps (which 
is shown in figure 4.2) stem from the fact that the discrete adjustment of the 
maximum acceptable payment level to the switch-over cost curve allows high-
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Figure 4.1 Economic, environmental, and supply control effects of programme participation 
for risk-neutral farmers: simple bidding scheme (variant 2a) versus fixed-rate offer 
system (variant 1) 
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Figure 4.2 Economic, environmental, and supply control effects of programme participation 
for risk-neutral farmers: bid pool auction (variant 4a) versus differentiated fixed-
rate payment (variant 3) 
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Table 4.2 Simulated performance of the extensification programme for risk-neutral decision 
makers under different payment schemes (flat-rate offer system = 100) 
Performance measures Variants 
1 
f lat-rate 
offer 
system 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
2a 
simple 
auction 
scheme 
124 
139 
173 
118 
185 
71 
117 
2b 
simple 
auction, 
budget 
109 
114 
126 
98 
129 
84 
116 
3 
offer 
system, 
pools 
98 
117 
180 
88 
203 
32 
134 
(100) 
4a 
bid pool 
auction 
scheme 
159 
231 
407 
198 
475 
29 
116 
(105) 
4b 
bid pool 
auction, 
budget 
117 
138 
199 
100 
220 
38 
138 
(107) 
A. Number of participants 
B. Total emission reduction 
C. Total output reduction 
D. Total programme outlays 
E. Total switch-over costs 
F. Net income transfer a) 
G. Emission reduction per unit 
of programme outlays (B/D) 
H. Output reduction per unit of 
programme outlays (C/D) 100 147 128 205 205 200 
(100) (109) (108) 
a) Total programme outlays minus total switch-over costs, i.e., overcompensation of switch-over 
costs. 
Table 4.3 Simulated performance of the extensification programme for risk-averse decision 
makers under different payment schemes (flat-rate offer system = 100) 
Performance measures Variants 
1 
flat-rate 
offer 
system 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
2a 
simple 
auction 
scheme 
125 
141 
176 
120 
188 
68 
118 
147 
2b 
simple 
auction, 
budget 
109 
114 
125 
98 
128 
83 
116 
127 
3 
offer 
system, 
pools 
107 
132 
204 
101 
230 
27 
131 
(100) 
201 
(100) 
4a 
bid pool 
auction 
scheme 
157 
224 
381 
191 
439 
26 
117 
(105) 
199 
(109) 
4b 
bid pool 
auction, 
budget 
116 
136 
192 
98 
210 
35 
139 
(112) 
195 
(107) 
A. Number of participants 
B. Total emission reduction 
C. Total output reduction 
D. Total programme outlays 
E. Total switch-over costs 
F. Net income transfer a) 
G. Emission reduction per unit 
of programme outlays (B/D) 
H. Output reduction per unit of 
programme outlays (C/D) 
a) Total programme outlays minus total switch-over costs, i.e., overcompensation of switch-over 
costs. 
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cost farmers, who rely more than others on polluting farming practices, to par-
ticipate. 
The largest improvement in programme cost-effectiveness is achieved in 
variant 4b, i.e. an auction scheme with regionalized bid caps and a limited bud-
get. With the same government outlays as in the reference variant, emission-
reduction and output reduction per unit of government outlays increases by 
38 and 100% in the risk-neutral case and by 39 and 95% in the risk-averse case, 
respectively. 
4.5 Auctions and information asymmetry 
Notwithstanding the improvements that can be achieved by differentiat-
ing payment rates and bid caps, it requires reliable information that is costly to 
obtain. It stands to reason that the more information is available and, thus, the 
more precisely bid caps and payment rates can be set, the better the pro-
gramme will perform. In the extreme, when the government has perfect infor-
mation about the switch-over cost curve, each farmer could be offered a pay-
ment to the amount of his or her profit foregone plus an incremental amount 
to encourage participation. It is clear that, in this case, the implementation of 
a bidding scheme does not yield any benefits. Conversely, the benefits of im-
plementing a bidding scheme are higher, the less information about switch-
over costs is available to the government, i.e., the larger the information gap 
between farmers and the government. The italic numbers in table 4.2 and 4.3 
give evidence of this: the efficiency gains of replacing a three-pool offer system 
(variant 3 - implying some information) by a bid pool auction scheme (4a and 
4b) are substantially lower than the gains that can be achieved by switching 
from the flat-rate offer system (variant 1 - implying very limited information) 
towards a simple auction scheme (2a and 2b). 
The matter of information asymmetry can also be examined from another 
angle: first, note that the rent of participation, denoted net income transfer in 
table 4.2 and 4.3, is in all variants below the level of the reference variant. The 
rent of participation can be regarded as returns to private information on the 
individual farmer's switch-over cost earned above the payment needed to en-
courage participation. The more information the government acquires, i.e., the 
smaller the information gap, the less the farmers wil l be able to extract high 
information rents because the government can, to a certain extent, identify 
and discriminate applicants with 'unreasonably' high bids. 
In this respect, it is important to note that the implementation of a bid-
ding environment reduces information asymmetry inherently, as the bidding 
process reveals, to a certain extent, the individual bidders' switch-over costs. 
Since the optimal bid is, among others, a linear function of the profit foregone, 
a high bid signals high switch-over costs and vice versa. This cost-revelation 
mechanism makes auctions a valuable tool for the government to cope with 
information asymmetry. 
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5. MANIPULATING CONTROL VARIABLES TO 
ENHANCE PROGRAMME PERFORMANCE 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter has shown that substantial gains in programme cost-
effectiveness can be elicited from implementing an auction market for conser-
vation contracts. The size of these benefits can be influenced by manipulating 
key control variables to directly target objectives. In this chapter, major control 
variables available to the government are identified and the impacts of its vari-
ations on programme performance are analysed. 
5.2 Enhancing bid competition in multiple-signup auctions 
Bid competition depends for the most part on the farmers' expectations 
about the maximum acceptable payment rate. Given multiple signups, ob-
served decisions in one period are likely to influence the bidders' expectation 
in the next period. The earlier mentioned U.S. CRP, gives evidence of this so-
called Bayesian learning. During the first four signups, the mean value of the 
bids increased (Osborn et al., 1990), while the distribution of the bids declined 
(Reichelderfer and Boggess, 1988), implying that the farmers had learned the 
bid caps. By the 9th signup, more than 80% of all bids were almost exactly 
equal to the bid caps (Osborn, personal communication). 
In the language of our bidding model, such learning narrows the 
range [ß,ß] of expectations about the maximum acceptable bid level. Accord-
ing to the optimal-bid formulas (8) and (12), this encourages farmers wishing 
to enroll low-cost land to bid at least ß , while high-cost farmers are discour-
aged from tendering bids, because ß is less than the cost of adopting the tar-
get technology. A decline in bid competition, thus, decreases programme per-
formance. In the extreme, when the bidders know the bid cap with certainty, 
i.e., ß equals ß , the bidding scheme degrades to a fixed-rate offer system. 
On the other hand, a very wide range [ß,ß] of expectations, which may 
occur in the first signup, encourages the farmers to tender 'unreasonably' high 
bids. This is immediately clear from the optimal-bid formulas (8) and (12). As a 
consequence, programme performance decreases, especially when total pro-
gramme outlays are limited. Low programme performance at both a narrow 
and a wide range of bid cap expectations implies that there is an 'optimal' 
range [ß,ß] that provides maximum bid competition. 
Figure 5.1 and 5.2 analyse, based on the data of the previous section, the 
impact of the range of bid cap expectations on selected performance measures. 
Figure 5.1 does this for a simple auction scheme without budget limitation 
(variant 2a) and figure 5.2 for one with budget constraint (variant 2b). All per-
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formance measures are depicted in relation to the flat-rate offer system for 
which the numbers are set to 100. 1) The range [ß,ß] of expectations is ex-
pressed by a factor c = [0,1] in combination wi th the average cost (AC) of 
adopting the target technology such that: J3=^C(1 c);ß./\C(1»c) . Inthe previ-
ous chapter c was assumed to be 0.4, bordering the range of expectations 
byß =40.2 and ß =93.8. 
Index 
- • — Number of participants 
» Total emission reduction 
_Q Total programme outlays 
I Emission reduction per unit of programme outlays 
Q Average bid 
0,8 0,9 1 
Range factor (c) 
Figure 5.1 The impact of the range of bid cap expectations on programme performance ijf-
fer system = 100) for a simple auction scheme without budget limitation 
(variant 2a) 
Figure 5.1 shows that an increase in the range of expectations encourages 
enrolment, because a wider range gives leeway to tender (high) bids for land 
with higher-than-average switch-over cost. Consequently, the environmental 
performance of the programme in terms of total emission reduction increases. 
Total programme outlays first decrease slightly due to increased bid competi-
1 ) Recall t h a t an o f fe r system is equ iva len t t o a b i dd ing system w i t h k n o w n b id cap. 
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t ion, but soon begin to rise and exceed the level of the offer system. The dis-
proportionate increase in outlays at high levels of c is caused both by the grow-
ing number of farmers enrolling high-cost land and the increase in the (opti-
mal) bids of farmers wishing to enroll lower-than-average cost land. This is 
reflected in the average-bid curve which cuts the reference level at c = 0.5. As 
a consequence, programme cost-effectiveness (emission reduction per unit of 
outlays) first increases, reaches its maximum at c = 0.3, then decreases and falls 
below the reference level at c = 0.7. A very wide spread of bid cap expectations, 
thus, may lead to outcomes worse than under an offer system. 
Index 
120 
- • — Number of participants 
—•— Total emission reduction 
- g — Total programme outlays 
I Emission reduction per unit of programme outlays 
« Average bid 
0,8 0,9 1 
Range factor (c) 
Figure 5.2 The impact of the range of bid cap expectations on programme performance (of-
fer system = 100) for a simple auction scheme with limited budget (variant 2 b) 
If total programme outlays are limited to the amount required for the 
flat-rate offer system, the impact of the range of bid cap expectations on pro-
gramme performance becomes more stringent (figure 5.2). Like above, all mea-
sures of performance improve with an increase in the range of expectations 
when the initial range is narrow. In contrast to a system without budget limita-
t ion, all performance measures deteriorate significantly if c exceeds a critical 
value of approximately 0.3, and programme outcomes fall below the level of 
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the offer system if c lies above 0.65. This decline in performance is caused by 
increasing (optimal) bid prices in combination with a fixed budget. The higher 
the bids, the less producers can be accepted within the overall budget. Note 
from figure 5.3 that the performance measures fall below the 100% mark at 
the point where the average bid exceeds this mark. 
In summary, it may be said that both a very narrow and a very wide range 
of bid cap expectations is undesirable with respect to programme performance. 
Wide-spread expectations are more risky in the sense that programme out-
comes may fall below the level that is attained with an offer system. 
These relationships call for the programme administrator to manipulate 
bidders' expectations in a way that provides maximum bid competition. On the 
one hand this requires keeping farmers in the dark about the maximum accept-
able payment rates. On the other hand, the farmers should be given some 
guide in forming their expectations, because too much uncertainty (i.e. a very 
wide range of expectations) may deteriorate programme performance. A way 
to influence the farmers' expectations in the desired direction could be to sim-
ply pre-announce the range in which the bid cap will be set. The actual bid cap 
can then be fixed either by the programme administrator or at random, as long 
as it is within the pre-announced range. In our example the range that provides 
maximum bid competition would have to be announced at average profit fore-
gone plus/minus 30% of this value. Such pre-announcing can be regarded as 
a strategy to accommodate and prevent strategic behaviour of the bidders. 
There is another benefit associated with a pre-announcement strategy. 
If the programme administrator knows both the amount of the bids and the 
values of ß and ß underlying those bids, the bidders' actual cost of adopting 
the target technology can be elicited by solving the optimal-bid formula (8) for 
(II0 - n,J. For bidder /', 
nw n i r 2 b , ß (14) 
Two things are important to note from this expression: 
1. the calculation can be carried out only if ß is publicly known; 
2. it provides the government with a way to reduce the information gap 
without having to acquire costly information on farmers' switch-over 
costs. 
The drawbacks of a pre-announcement strategy in a multiple-signup auc-
tion stem from the need to enforce what has been announced: the ex-post bid 
cap has to be within the pre-announced range and to be actually enforced, i.e. 
it has to be effectuated as an exclusion level. Moreover, over multiple signups 
the ex-post bid cap has to be varied within the whole pre-announced range. 
If the government fails to do so, the system will lose credibility, encouraging 
farmers to bid strategically again (based on own expectations rather than the 
pre-announced ones), making the potential advantages of the pre-announce-
ment strategy largely vanish. These requirements restrict the administrator's 
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possibilities to set the maximum acceptable payment rates according to objec-
tive needs like a budget limitation or an enrolment target. 
5.3 Designing efficient bid acceptance procedures 
It has been assumed so far that the government accepts bids, starting 
with the lowest bid price, within the overall budget. This implies the assump-
tion that the government's objective is to maximize enrolment wi th a limited 
amount of public money. Under a wider perspective, the government's objec-
tive should be characterized as to maximize environmental benefits (and/or 
supply control), given a fixed amount of money 1). This requires the govern-
ment to recognize each farmer's contribution to the achievement of the objec-
tives pursued by the programme. 
If some information is available which allows the programme administra-
tor to roughly estimate the prospective environmental (and supply control) 
effects of enrolling each farmers' land, all bids received could be ranked ac-
cording to the ratio of 'impacts' to public cost of enrolling the land. Most of 
the information needed could be gathered as part of the bidding process. The 
bidders could be required to supply data, for example, on the actual level of 
farming intensity, yields, and other characteristics of their technology. This in-
formation could be supplemented by data about the environmental sensitivity 
of the land, such as soil type, some soil leachability measure, location of the 
land in a designated area of environmental sensitivity, proximity to water bod-
ies, etc. Those data will become available at decreasing cost with the progres-
sive implementation of Geographic Information Systems. Certainly, those data 
are only proxies of the actual environmental effects of farming activities. 
Therefore, bid acceptance decisions will inevitably have to be met in an envi-
ronment of imperfect information. 
In the United States, a bid selection process which directly targets pro-
gramme objectives was developed for the Conservation Reserve Programme 
(CRP) after the General Accounting Office had heavily criticized the old bid 
acceptance method which was aimed at minimizing public cost of enrolment 
subject to an enrolment target (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1989). Bids are 
now ranked for acceptance based on the ratio of an environmental benefit 
index (EBI) to the Government cost of the contract. The EBI is a parcel-specific 
estimate of the potential contribution to each of the seven programme goals 
that the land would provide if enrolled (USDA-ERS, 1994). Since the bid accep-
tance process must be completed within 60 days, the EBI relies on a few readily 
available data (Osborn, personal communication). 
1) Note that this is a strict public-finance view. Ideally, the government should 
pursue economic efficiency rather than procurement efficiency. This, however, 
requires information on the monetary value of the environmental benefits of 
adopting the conservation technology. Since this information is usually not 
available at reasonable cost, this study continues to focus on procurement 
efficiency. 
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The model developed in this report was employed to estimate the effects 
of a bid acceptance system that ranks all bids received according to the ratio 
of nitrogen reduction (h,, - n) to the individual farmer's (optimal bid) b,., here-
after called cost-effectiveness acceptance mechanism. Undoubtedly, it would 
have been better to directly target emissions. In practice, however, non-point 
source emissions from agriculture like those considered here, are hard to ob-
serve or measure. Therefore, it is realistic to target an observable proxy which 
is assumed to be closely correlated with emissions. In the Netherlands, for ex-
ample, farmers are required by law to keep records on the quantities of fertiliz-
ers and pesticides purchased and applied. This information could be used for 
bid ranking in the acceptance process. 
The results of the model simulation are presented in table 5.1 for the case 
of risk-neutral bidders 1). Like above, programme performance is measured 
relative to the flat-rate offer system. The table shows that the implementation 
of an auction scheme with a cost-effectiveness acceptance mechanism enhances 
programme performance significantly. Although the number of participants is 
almost constant in all variants considered, aggregate emissions and total out-
put are reduced by 29 and 7 1 % under the simple auction scheme and by 
Table 5.1 Simulated performance of the extensification programme for risk-neutral decision 
makers, with bid acceptance based on the ratio of nitrogen reduction to the 
amount of the bid (flat-rate offer system = 100). 
Pe 
A. 
B. 
C. 
D. 
E. 
F. 
G. 
H. 
rformance measures 
Number of participants 
Total emission reduction 
Total output reduction 
Total programme outlays 
Total switch-over costs 
Net income transfer b) 
Emission reduction per uni t 
of programme outlays (B/D) 
Output reduction per uni t 
of programme outlays (C/D) 
Variants 
1 
f lat-rate offer 
system 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
simpli 
2b 
5 auction 
scheme; cost 
effectiveness 
rankii 
98 
129 
171 
100 
184 
57 
130 
171 
i g a) 
(109) 
(114) 
(126) 
(98) 
(129) 
(84) 
(116) 
(128) 
4b 
bid pool auction 
scheme ;; cost-
effectiveness 
ranking a) 
102 
143 
217 
100 
246 
25 
143 
217 
(117) 
(138) 
(199) 
(100) 
(220) 
(38) 
(138) 
(200) 
a) The numbers in parentheses refer to table 4.2 (bid acceptance based on the amount of the 
bid only); b) Total programme outlays minus total switch-over costs, i.e., overcompensation of 
switch-over costs. 
1) The results for risk-averse bidders do not differ significantly from those 
presented here. 
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43 and 117 under the bid pool auction scheme, respectively. Since these im-
provements are achieved with (approximately) the same amount of outlays, 
programme cost-effectiveness with respect to both goals (row G and H) in-
creases by the same degree. 
To isolate the effects of the cost-effectiveness selection mechanism, the 
performance measures are compared with those of table 4.2 (in parentheses), 
where bid acceptance is based only on the amount of the bids, regardless of 
the individual bidders' potential contribution to the programme goals. Al-
though the number of participants is lower under the cost-effectiveness accep-
tance procedure, all other performance measures lie significantly above the 
ones for the corresponding auction schemes without cost-effectiveness ranking. 
This is because under the targeted bid selection system mainly farmers with 
higher than average switch-over costs and higher than average emission load-
ings are accepted for participation, while the reverse is true for the untargeted 
bid selection. 
Note from table 5.1 that the benefits of implementing a cost-effective-
ness selection mechanism are higher under the simple auction scheme than 
under the bid pool auction. This is again a matter of information asymmetry. 
In a simple auction, implying limited information about farm-level relation-
ships, the marginal value of the information about the individual farmers' fer-
tilizer use as provided with their bids, is high, translating into high gains in 
programme performance. In a bid pool auction, implying some farm-level in-
formation, the value of the additional information is lower, resulting in a lower 
increase in the performance measures. 
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6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The presented results indicate that the implementation of an auction 
scheme for agricultural conservation contracts, instead of a fixed-rate offer 
system, can yield substantial gains in programme cost-effectiveness. The bene-
fits of auctions are greater the larger the information asymmetry on switch-
over costs between individual farmers and the government. The main contribu-
t ion of this article is that it makes auction theory applicable to conservation 
contracting. Moreover, the theoretical concepts developed are supported wi th 
some insights into the quantitative implications of implementing an auction for 
conservation contracts. Nevertheless, some simplifying assumptions had to be 
made, both with respect to issues related to the conservation programme and 
to auction theory. Starting with the former, for ease of analysis it was assumed, 
for instance, that farmers only grow grains and can enroll their land only on an 
all-or-nothing basis. Moreover, the conservation programme considered con-
sists of one restriction only, while in practice most conservation programmes 
impose a package of restrictions. It is expected, however, that those assump-
tions do not necessarily violate the conclusions drawn so far. The potential 
gains achievable by implementing an auction, namely, mainly hinge on the 
extent to which information asymmetry between farmers and the government 
is present, regardless of the complexity of the conservation contracts consid-
ered. The latter becomes relevant only if it increases the costs involved in bid 
preparation to such an extent that it stops farmers from submitting bids. 
With respect to auction theory, some of the Benchmark assumptions are 
relaxed in order to portray the auction environment of conservation contracts 
as accurately as possible. Nevertheless, some problems inherent to auction the-
ory in general remain. For instance, the assumption of independent private 
values requires that farmers know precisely their profits foregone. In practice, 
however, there is often a common element of uncertainty among farmers 
about the consequences of adopting the conservation technology, resulting in 
affi l iated values instead of independent private values. In this case theory is 
ambiguous about the choice of the optimal auction form. Theory also leaves 
us with ambiguity if more than one Benchmark assumption is relaxed simulta-
neously. Moreover, the previous analysis considered an auction in isolation of 
the environment in which it takes place, which may have unexpected implica-
tions. For instance, farmers have proved to be reluctant to participate in conser-
vation programmes because they distrust the government to allow them to 
remove the realized amenities after the contract has expired. This may have 
unforeseeable implications for the willingness to participate and bidding be-
haviour. 
Bearing this in mind, how useful is auction theory to assist practical auc-
tion design? Looking at its direct application by decision makers, one can con-
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elude that the use of auction theory for practical auction design is very limited. 
To the best of our knowledge, there is only one very recent example in which 
auction theory is extensively used for practical auction design: the selling of 
spectrum rights in the U.S. (Anonymous, 1994; McMillan, 1994). Although the-
ory in this case has turned out to have limits, its predecessor, the 1990 New 
Zealand spectrum auction, came up with embarrassing results which could have 
been avoided easily by consulting auction theory. Because of its shortcomings, 
the theory, however, cannot provide us with a cut-and-dried solution, although 
it can play an important role in communicating and thinking about auction 
design and bidding behaviour. Besides, it may avoid possible pitfalls that could 
otherwise occur. Nevertheless, as each auction situation is in fact unique, judg-
ment and guesswork will be needed to merge the various partial theories, to 
weigh the government's objectives, to estimate the relative sizes of the differ-
ent effects, etc. (McMillan, 1994). In the area of conservation contracting the 
aforementioned arguments can be eloquently illustrated by taking the case of 
the CRP programme. It demonstrated the presence of Bayesian learning after 
multiple signups, making the potential gains achievable by using an auction 
largely vanish. Moreover, evidence suggests that the implementation of the 
CRP in 1986 was suboptimal and that substantial increases in programme cost-
effectiveness could have been achieved if the government would have identi-
fied the control variables and the impact of variations in it on programme per-
formance (Reichelderfer and Boggess, 1988). The analysis in this article supplies 
sufficient clues to assume that auction theory, if consulted, would have been 
able to predict both pitfalls in advance. 
This article gives an initial impetus to the use of auction theory in optimal 
auction design for conservation contracting. More research is needed in order 
to make auction theory better applicable to the specific features of conserva-
tion contracts. The challenge for researchers is to communicate auction theory 
and its potential advantages in an accessible way to decision makers. Policy 
makers are encouraged to smoothen the path for implementing auctions in 
conservation contracting and to leave behind political objections that so far 
have been unduly impeding their application. 
41 
REFERENCES 
Anonymous (1993) 
Agri-environmental policy and discretionary incentive mechanisms: the 
Countryside Stewardship Scheme as a case study; Unpublished Working 
paper, University of Oxford 
Anonymous (1994) 
Revenge of the nerds; When government auctioneers need worldly ad-
vice, where can they turn ? To mathematical economists, of course; The 
Economist, July 23rd 
Baneth, M.H. (1994) 
Auctions as a means of creating a market for environmental services in 
the countryside; Paper presented at the Workshop on Agricultural Policy 
and the Countryside; Oslo; December 8-9 
Claupein, W. (1994) 
Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der Extensivierung im Ackerbau; Triade 
Verlag Erika Claupein; Göttingen 
Colman, D. (1989) 
Economic Issues From The Broads Grazing Marshes Conservation Scheme; 
Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol.40 (3), pp. 336-344 
Colman, D. (1991) 
Land Purchase as a Means of Providing External Benefits from Agricul-
ture; In: Hanly, N. (ed) Farming and the Countryside; An Economic Analy-
sis of External Costs and Benefits; CAB International, pp. 215-229 
Fraser, R. (1991) 
Nice work if you can get it: an analysis of optimal set-aside; Oxford Agrar-
ian Studies, Vol.19, No.1, pp. 61-69 
Gasson, R. and C. Potter (1988) 
Conservation through land diversion: a survey of farmers' attitudes; Jour-
nal of Agricultural Economics, Vol.39, No.1, pp. 340-351 
Hydro Agri Dülmen, ed. (1993) 
Faustzahlen für Landwirtschaft und Gartenbau; 12th edition; Verlags-
union Agrar; Münster-Hiltrup 
42 
Korn, G.A. and J.M. Korn (1968) 
Mathematical Handbook for Scientists and Engineers; New York, 
McGraw-Hill 
Laffont, J.J. (1989) 
The Economics of Uncertainty and Information; The MIT Press Cambridge, 
Massachusetts and London, England 
Latacz-Lohmann, U. (1993) 
Ausgestaltung des Prämiensystems als Mittel zur Steigerung der Effek-
tivität von Extensivierungs- und Vertragsnaturschutzprogrammen; Agrar-
wirtschaft, 42, Heft 10, pp. 351-358 
Law, A.M. and W.D. Kelton (1991) 
Simulation Modelling & Analysis; Second Edition; New York, McGraw-Hill 
series in industrial engineering and management science 
Lynne, G.D., J.S. Shonkwiler and L.R. Rola (1988) 
Attitudes and Farmer Conservation Behaviour; American Journal of Agri-
cultural Economics, Vol.70, No.1, pp. 12-19 
Matthews, S.A. (1983) 
Selling to Risk Averse Buyers with unobservable Tastes; Journal of Eco-
nomic Theory, Vol.30, No.2, pp. 370-400 
McAfee, R.P. and J. McMillan (1987) 
Auctions and Bidding; Journal of Economic Literature, Vol.XXV, 
pp.699-738 
McMillan, J. (1994) 
Selling Spectrum Rights; Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol.8, No.3, 
pp. 145-162 
Milgrom, P.R. (1989) 
Auctions and Bidding: A Primer; Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol.1, 
No.1, pp. 1-14 
Milgrom, P.R. and R.J. Weber (1982) 
A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding; Econometrica, Vol. 50, pp. 
1089-1122 
Ministerie van Landbouw Natuurbeheer en Visserij (1993) 
Regeling beheersovereenkomsten 1993; Utrecht, Directie Beheer Land-
bouwgronden 
43 
Myerson, R.B. (1981) 
Optimal Auction Design; Mathematics of Operations Research, 6, 
pp. 58-73 
Osborn, CT., F. Lacuna and M. Linsenbigler (1990) 
The Conservation Reserve Program; Enrolment Statistics for Signup Peri-
ods 1-9 and Fiscal Year 1989; USDA-ERS Statistical Bulletin 811; 
Washington, D.C. 
Potter, C.( 1991) 
Land Diversion Programmes as Generators of Public Good; In: Hanly, N. 
(ed); Farming and the Countryside; An Economic Analysis of External 
Costs and Benefits; CAB International, pp. 230-249 
Reichelderfer, K. and W.G. Boggess (1988) 
Government Decision Making and Program Performance: The Case of the 
Conservation Reserve Program; American Journal of Agricultural Econom-
ics, Vol. 70, No.1, pp. 1-11 
Riley, J. and W. Samuelson (1981) 
Optimal Auctions; American Economic Review, Vol. 71, pp. 381-392 
Rothkopf, M.H. and R.M. Harstad (1994) 
Modelling Competitive Bidding: A Critical Essay; Management Science, 
Vol. 40, No.3, pp. 364-384 
Schindler, M. (1990) 
Extensivierung der Düngung - Wirkungen auf Erträge, Produktionstech-
nik und Einkommen unter derzeitigen und geänderten Rahmenbedin-
gungen; Unpublished doctoral dissertation; Department of Agricultural 
Economics, Göttingen 
Shubik, M. (1970) 
On Different Methods for Allocating Resources; Kyklos; Internationale 
Zeitschrift Für Sozialwissenschaften, 23, pp. 332-337 
U.S. General Accounting Office (1989) 
Farm Programs: Conservation Reserve Program Could be Less Costly and 
More Effective; GAO/RCED-90-13, Washington, D.C. 
USDA-ERS, ed. (1994) 
Analysis of the Conservation Reserve Program: Farmers' Plans and Envi-
ronmental Targeting Issues; Washington, D.C. 
Vickrey, W. (1961) 
Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders; Journal 
of Finance, Vol.16, No.1, pp. 8-37 
44 
APPENDIX 
45 
Appendix 1 Derivation of the optimal-bid formula of a risk-averse 
decision maker 
Assumptions: 
1. The decision maker has a utility function of the form U(Y) = In Y, where Y is the 
income from market production and, in case of participation, the conservation 
payment; 
2. The bidder's expectations about the bid cap are uniformly distributed in the 
range [ß,ß] . 
The risk premium is a function of the income level and the income variability and 
can be expressed by using the Arrow-Pratt absolute risk aversion coefficient as follows 
(for a detailed discussion see Laffont, 1989): 
RP-±°^ (A1) 
2 U{Y) K ' 
where o2 is the variance of income. Applying the utility function U(Y) = In Y leads to 
W 0 =V 0 -1 and flP^.lc^-L-
2 n0 2 n,.b (A2) 
{non participation) (participation) 
Substituting the formula for RP,(b) and the functional form (7) of the distribu-
t ion funct ion into the optimal-bid formula (12) leads to : 
*•«• * -»' ^ n ^ ( 4 ^ f p b ) ) (A3) 
The optimal bid is found by solving equation (A3) consistently for b, which is, in 
fact, a mathematically somewhat complicated venture. By multiplication and rear-
rangement of terms in (A3), in the first step, a cubic equation is obtained of the form: 
(A4) 
b3cb2gbh-0 
with 
r 5n, n0.Rp0 p 
g.n1(2i1-n(r»,o-@ 
h ri1(n^-n1p-n1n0.n1/y0-o.5o2) 0 2 5 g ^ 
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Now Cardan's Solution for cubic equations can be applied (for details see, for 
example, Korn and Korn, 1968) by transforming equation (A4) to the 'reduced' form: 
x3.px-q.Q , . f g •a -SL.h 3 (A5) 
through the substitution b-x — . The roots x,, x2, and x3 of the 'reduced' cubic equa-
t ion (A5) are: 
Xy-AB 
"2.3-
AB AB n 
with (A6) 
9 
N~2 \ J l 3 
p|3.UÏ2 
N 2 " \ 3 f>\
3
 UY 
The optimal-bid formula of a risk-averse decision maker under the assumptions 
set out above then is: 
b„.max|x-|, ß s.t bm>Œ0-Œ, (A7) 
Among the three solutions that (A7) yields the one with fara e[ß,ß] is the opti-
mal bid. Therewith the optimal bid of a risk-averse decision-maker is a function of 
(II0. " i . P. B. o» o5 • 
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